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Abstract
The citizens of the United Kingdom shocked the world on June 23rd, 2016 when they
voted in favor of leaving the European Union. The 3-year aftermath of the Referendum has
created a large amount of uncertainty regarding the future of the United Kingdom economy and
its post-Brexit relationship with the European Union. The purpose of this research is to explore
how the financial markets react to Brexit news headlines, compare the returns of European and
non-European exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and currencies, identify common themes, and
ultimately shed light on how investors weigh-in on the interconnectedness of the UK, the EU,
and the broader global markets. After researching the major milestones in the development of
Brexit, twenty-three different events were selected for this study. To look at the financial
market’s reaction, UK, EU, Germany, United States, and South African ETFs and currency
returns in response to Brexit news were recorded. The results show that positive Brexit news
headlines are a universal benefit but generate higher returns for the European Union and
Germany as opposed to the United Kingdom itself, and that shared negative returns affect the
United Kingdom to a greater extent. Investors are pricing in the uncertain and negative
implications of Brexit to the point where the United Kingdom has limited upside and plenty of
downside within the realms of the financial markets.
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I.

Introduction
On June 23rd, 2016, the people of the United Kingdom made a country-altering decision

by voting to leave the European Union. The surprising result from the Referendum caused
turmoil in the financial markets as the pound fell -8% and global investors no longer had a clear
vision of the future economy of the United Kingdom and Europe. Three years have passed since
the Referendum, and the relationship between the United Kingdom and Europe has only become
more confusing, complicated, and unpredictable. As news headlines regarding Brexit appear in
the paper each morning, investors must perform the difficult task of pricing in Brexit as they
place in their trades and provide sound financial advice for their clients, and international
businesses must successfully develop a strategy that prepares them for a potentially disruptive
exit from the bloc.
The purpose of this research is to explore and analyze the relationship between financial
market returns and Brexit news headlines. The analysis will be from a European and nonEuropean perspective so all global stakeholders, who may potentially be impacted by Brexit, are
accounted for. By observing the financial markets reactions to Brexit developments, connections
and trends within the stock and currency markets will be identified and will ultimately shed light
on how investors price in the negative and positive implications of the UK exiting the EU. To
bring a degree of context to Brexit, the thesis will first lay-out the historical relationship between
the United Kingdom and the European Union and will finish the background with an explanation
as to why the UK citizens voted in favor of Brexit. Starting from the day of the Referendum in
June of 2016 and finishing in March of 2019, twenty-three Brexit events were selected and
various exchange-traded funds (ETF) and currency returns surrounding the events were recorded
and analyzed. By doing so, this research will identify how investors price in the uncertainty
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regarding Brexit, investigate the interconnectedness of the global markets, and determine which
countries have the most upside or downside with Brexit.
From a stock market standpoint, the results show that the United Kingdom ETF
benchmark was the only one with an overall negative return, and that on an actual positive return
basis the United Kingdom had the lowest average compared to all other benchmarks. Further,
approximately 70% of the same-direction ETF movements amongst the UK, Germany and EU
were associated with positive news developments, as well as 82.35% of the time with the United
States. In terms of the currencies in this study, the pound had the lowest average return and the
lowest average negative-only return. Global currency connection was showcased as the pound
and the dollar had a negative correlation of -85.60% which indicates that because of the
uncertainty surrounding the UK economy, investors safe-guarded their assets in the consistent
United States economy whenever unfavorable Brexit events occurred. These results summarize
the conclusion that positive Brexit news headlines are a universal benefit but generate higher
returns for the European Union and Germany as opposed to the United Kingdom itself, and that
shared negative returns affect the United Kingdom to a greater extent. Investors are pricing in the
uncertain and negative implications of Brexit to the point where the United Kingdom has limited
upside and plenty of downside within the realms of the financial markets.
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to explaining the history behind the
European Union and the United Kingdom as well as explaining the results and conclusions of the
stock market and currency return research. Specifically, Section II is the Literature Review
which explains the history behind the United Kingdom and the European Union Pre-Brexit,
discusses the details surrounding Brexit, and outlines the key Brexit events that are used in the
study. Section III contains the Research Questions regarding the ETF and currency returns and
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predictions. Section IV outlines the methodology behind the data collection and analysis for the
study. Section V contains the results for the stock returns, currency returns, and prediction
returns accuracy. Section VI is the conclusion of the paper which will contain limitations, further
research, and final thoughts regarding the results of the thesis.
II.

Literature Review
A. The Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union: PreBrexit
The complicated relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union

originates back to the middle of the 20th century. After the end of World War II, Western Europe
was greatly divided and needed to re-develop a connection between the neighboring countries.
One solution to this problem was signed into law on March 25th, 1957, the Treaty of Rome
established the European Economic Community (EEC) which eventually become the European
Union (Pruitt, 2017). The EEC brought together France, West Germany, Belgium, Italy,
Luxemburg, and the Netherlands through a law binding relationship based on the free movement
of goods, people, services, and capital (Eur-Lex, 2017). Essentially, the underlying goal of the
EEC was to unite the six countries by gradually aligning their economic policies, abolishing
trade quotas and customs duties in the EEC, creating a shared tariff on imports from outside the
EEC, and creating a provision where the EEC could implement further joint policies.
Specifically, the EEC created a European Social Fund to improve job conditions and create
opportunities for workers, and a European Investment Bank (EIB) to help further economic
expansion (Eur-Lex, 2017).
The complications between the United Kingdom and the EEC begin to take form in 1963
when their first application to become a member of the EEC is vetoed by French president
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Charles de Gaulle (Pruitt, 2017). In 1967, the United Kingdom executes an additional failed
attempt to join the EEC as Charles de Gaulle vetoes their membership a second time. The second
veto had the same rationale as the first; British membership would ultimately break up the EEC
community (BBC On This Day, 1967). At a news conference at the Elysee Palace in Paris,
President de Gaulle accused Britain of a “deep-seated hostility” towards European construction,
and that numerous aspects of Britain’s economy made them incompatible with Europe (BBC,
2018). Charles de Gaulle also held a staunch belief that if Britain joined, the English language
could potentially replace French as the dominant language in the EEC (Pruitt, 2017).
France was the only country in the EEC that opposed Britain’s membership, and with
President Charles de Gaulle resignation in 1969, Britain’s likelihood of becoming a member of
the EEC increased exponentially. On January 1, 1973, Britain, alongside Ireland and Denmark,
was admitted into the European Economic Community. By being granted membership, Britain
was given the right to four votes within the EEC council, which proposed policies ranging from
environmental issues to public health (BBC On This Day, 1973). According to Sir Crispin
Tickell, who participated in the negotiations that led to the UK’s accession to the EEC and later
became the British ambassador to the UN, becoming a member of the EEC went far beyond the
trade benefits associated with it. From the very beginning, the United Kingdom understood that
the EEC would eventually evolve into a political union, as opposed to a simple free-trade
agreement (Tickell, 2016). Therefore, Ted Heath, the prime minister of Britain at the time during
the negotiations, wanted to make sure that they were part of the initial shaping of this political
collective (Tickell, 2016).
However, the United Kingdom’s full-on commitment to the EEC was relatively shortlived, as the first national referendum associated with staying in the EEC took place in 1975. At

8

this point in the UK’s history, there was a deep divide between the Labour party and the
Conservative party. The Labour party, led by Tony Benn, were those that wanted to leave the
EEC, while the conservative party, led by Margaret Thatcher, wanted to remain. The Labour
party based their pro-leave ECC argument on poor economic conditions, reduction in jobs, and
an increase in the trade deficit. For example, the Labour party reiterated the point that inflation
was running at a rate of 24% since the common market forced Britain to buy food from other
member states, while cheap imports such as butter from New Zealand, was banned. The Labour
party went on to state that the price of butter would ultimately double by the year 1978 if they
stayed in the EEC (Wheeler, 2016). Tony Benn went on to claim that Britain’s membership in
the EEC had eliminated 500,000 British jobs in two years due to the growing trade deficit
between Britain and the EEC (Wheeler, 2016). However, the Conservative party made the
argument that being a member of EEC created food security for the United Kingdom, as Britain
benefited from being a part of a community which was self-sufficient in food (Wheeler, 2016).
Regarding the unemployment figures, the Conservative party claimed that the Labour party
fabricated the potential impact on the future unemployment rate and that the real cause behind
the rising unemployment rate was due to a global slump, not solely because of EEC membership
(Wheeler, 2016). Immigration was not yet an issue for those who wanted to leave the EEC as
free movement amongst European countries was not yet occurring; Britain was experiencing
terrible economic conditions, which made immigration far less desirable for those living in other
nations (Wheeler, 2016). The Labour Party campaign efforts ultimately failed on June 5, 1975, as
67.2% of Britain voted to remain in Europe (Nelsson, 2015).
After the Referendum vote, tensions remained between the United Kingdom and Europe.
The United Kingdom continued to be divided between two separate political parties: the
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Conservative Party, and The Labour Party. However, there was also a split amongst the
Conservative Party on whether Britain should maintain a free-trade relationship with Europe.
This divide dates to the original 1961 application to join the EEC, but it began to take a stronger
hold under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher (Jones, 2007). One example of the negative
attitude towards Europe is Britain’s refusal to join the European Monetary System in 1979. The
European Monetary System was an arrangement where most nations in the EEC would link their
currencies to prevent fluctuations, but the United Kingdom opted out and remained independent
with the pound (Tendera-Wlazczuk, 2018). Thatcher also began to make the claim that Britain
paid too much into the EEC budget and that the budget itself allocated too many resources
towards agriculture. Thatcher’s stance on Britain’s economic contributions to the EEC remained
stable throughout her time as prime minister. By the time she stepped down as Prime Minister of
Britain (due to the strong conflict she created within her party over her increasingly Eurosceptic
views), she left her Conservative Party relatively directionless on their stance with the current
European relationship (Jones, 2007). During the Conservative Party’s internal conflict, the
Labour Party remained collectively strong in their opinion of European relations. At the time of
the 1983 General Election, the Labour Party ran their campaign on the notion that the United
Kingdom should withdraw from the EEC because of the negative impact it had on United
Kingdom jobs. Although they suffered a major defeat in the general election, it still represents
another time in the UK’s history where large masses of people united under the common cause
of splitting from Europe.
While Britain’s divide on European relations steadily deepened, main-land Europe
continued to progress their relationship from a free-trade agreement to a political union. In 1993,
The Maastricht Treaty was signed into law by twelve countries, and it created the current
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European Union. The signing of this treaty was a monumental moment in European history, as it
laid the groundwork for using a single currency (the euro), created European citizenship and
allowed citizens to reside and move freely between countries in the EU, a common foreign and
security policy was established, and closer cooperation for judiciary matters amongst the
countries was agreed upon (European Central Bank, 2017). The Treaty also went on to establish
the European Central Bank, which was given the responsibility of maintaining price stability for
the euro (European Central Bank, 2017). Although the United Kingdom signed The Maastricht
Treaty, they continued to remain comparatively distant to the newly forged European Union.
Thatcher’s successor, John Major, agreed to enter the European Union but only under certain
conditions. For example, he negotiated ‘opt-outs’ where the United Kingdom did not agree to use
the single-currency (euro) system (Jones, 2007). Although the United Kingdom continued to
remain in the European Union, they were never as committed to the cause when compared to the
other eleven signees.
The signing of The Maastricht Treaty became the tipping point for UK citizens who were
anti-Europe. On September 3, 1993, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) was formed based on
opposition to UK membership in the European Union (Hunt, 2014). UKIP was able to gain
support amongst UK citizens due to their stance on immigration. The European Union supported
pro-free movement for immigrants within the European Union, while the UKIP party wanted
Britain to leave the EU and create a far stricter immigration policy (Hunt, 2014). The presence of
UKIP was originally overshadowed by the high-profile Referendum Party but eventually began
to gain voting share in national elections as UK citizens became more opposed to openimmigration policies. In 1999, UKIP only managed to gain a 7% vote share in European

11

elections, but by 2014 their party enrollment increased, and they gained a 27.5% share of
European election votes (Hunt, 2014).
The growth of UKIP does not come as a surprise, as the time of 1993 through 2016 is
associated with growing “Euroscepticism” amongst the people of the United Kingdom.
Euroscepticism is the phrase used to describe UK citizen’s belief of either completely cutting ties
off with the EU or reducing UK’s role but remaining a member nation (Curtice, 2016). Statistical
analysis conducted by researcher John Curtice sheds light on the growing rate of Euroscepticism.
For example, the percentage of UK citizens who wanted to leave the EU grew from 10% in 1992
to 22% in 2015 (Curtice, 2016). It is also interesting to note that the percentage of citizens who
wanted to stay in the EU, but reduce its powers increased from 30% in 1992 to 43% in 2015
(Curtice, 2016). To gain a better perspective on the specific changes UK citizens would like to
see, 68% agreed that the UK should reduce the ability of migrants from other EU countries to
claim welfare benefits in Britain, 60% agreed that they should reduce how much the EU
regulates companies and businesses, and 51% agreed that they should end the automatic right of
people from other EU countries to come to Britain to live and work (Curitce, 2016). In terms of
cultural issues, 80% of those who wanted to withdraw claimed that the EU is undermining
Britain’s distinctive identity (Curtice, 2016). In terms of the economy, 80% of the individuals
who wanted to withdraw believed the economy would be much better if the UK left, while 98%
of those who wanted to continue in the EU claimed the economy would be much worse if they
left (Curtice, 2016). This statistical analysis goes to show that the citizens of the UK were torn
on key issues such as immigration and economic policy, and this deep-rooted strong political
divide became the driving force behind the move towards Brexit.

12

The political figures in the UK saw a clear trend towards Euroscepticism and decided to
use it for their own political gain. The Prime Minister at the time, David Cameron, was a staunch
advocate of remaining within the European Union and would often reject the idea of holding a
vote to leave the bloc. However, as the UK elections in 2015 arrived, Cameron claimed that if his
Conservative government was re-elected he would bring an EU referendum to a public vote
(Iyendar, 2016). Considering the hard (and growing) divide amongst the UK citizens regarding
the future of the UK and the EU, it came to no surprise that David Cameron won the election and
was re-elected as Prime Minister. As promised, the European Union Referendum Act 2015 was
introduced in the British Parliament and ultimately led to the Referendum vote held in June 2016
(Iyendar, 2016).
B. A Discussion of Brexit
On June 23rd, 2016, 72.2% of the voting age population of the United Kingdom voted in
the Referendum which decided the fate of their membership in the European Union. To the
surprise of the United Kingdom and the rest of the world, 51.9% of those who voted chose to
leave the EU, while 48.1% voted to remain (Tendera-Wlazczuk, 2018). The people who
supported Brexit tended to be older, white, working class, and had lower levels of education.
Those who did not support Brexit tended to have deep social values and considered themselves
to be more liberal (Corbett, 2016). Although the vote came as a surprise, a careful analysis of the
literature on the causes of Brexit shines a light on the inevitable exit of the European Union.
As discussed in the previous section, growth in Euroscepticism is a key driver behind the
shocking referendum vote. Specifically, only 33% of Europeans trusted the EU, and 27% were
negatively inclined towards it (Tendera-Wlazczuk, 2018). A strong devotion to British
Euroscepticism can be traced back to the fall of the British Empire and the general economic
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decline that many Brexit supporters claim is associated with EU membership (Corbett, 2016).
Specifically, research conducted by Nicholas Starten claims that the three largest drivers for
moving Euroscepticism towards main-stream British politics are the Maastricht Treaty in 1992,
the EU member state expansion in 2004, and the global financial crisis in 2008 (Corbett, 2016).
In fact, history claims that opposition to European integration has always been a major factor in
British politics; dating back to the 1975 referendum, Britain has always taken a critical stance on
EU decisions (Corbett, 2016).
In recent times, the expansion of the EU in 2004 accompanied with increasing mitigation
(free movement between member states) created more competition for low-income middle-class
workers in the UK. A combination of poor economic conditions and an inflow of workers into
the UK created a lot of unease for blue-collar workers, and it became very easy for the rightwing news outlets to place blame on the immigrants, help fuel the negative feelings towards EU
membership, increase UKIP membership, while also developing a strong sense of independentEnglish nationalism (Corbett, 2016). This sense of English nationalism is deeply rooted and was
re-ignited amongst the older generation; the increase of immigrants entering the country
threatened to dilute the traditional English identity (Corbett, 2016). In fact, the rise of
immigration is crucial to Brexit. Under the Blair government, immigration reached record high
levels. By 2013, 1.24 million people born in Eastern Europe now lived in the UK, as compared
to 170,000 in 2004 (Coleman, 2016). Between 2013 and 2014, the UK’s population increased by
over 500,000 million people, which resulted in the biggest inflow of people in the nation’s
history and helped deepen the resentment towards the EU, create an over-capacity problem, and
make low-skill jobs more competitive (Coleman, 2016).
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An article written by Brian Griffiths presents an interesting argument in defense of
Brexit. The first claim is a rather simple one; the EU is not working (Griffiths, 2016). The euro
was originally a good idea when it was first implemented between the original six members, who
economists claimed were in an “optimal currency area”; intuitively this makes sense, as free
movement was expected to cross these countries borders. However, the euro is now dispersed to
19 countries with vastly different economies (Griffiths, 2016). Also, the euro was set up as a
monetary union but does not have a banking union, a political union, or a fiscal union. Without
the ability to devalue or revalue currencies, EU countries must rely on adjusting domestic fiscal
policy and change the level of wages (Griffiths. 2016). Another aspect of the EU that is not
working is the issue with open-borders. As the borders have become open amongst member
nations, terrorist attacks have increased, and EU nations have begun to make attempts at better
controlling their borders. However, this goes against the purpose of the EU, as free movement is
one of the pillars of the union (Griffiths, 2016). To Griffiths, these flaws in the EU are the reason
behind the “ever closer union” movement. By re-branding themselves, the EU has hopes of
having more control over taxes, immigration quotas, and even proposing a European army
(Griffiths, 2016).
With the re-branding occurring, Griffiths claims that now is the time for the UK to regain
control of their own affairs. He goes on to claim that the UK leaving the EU is also good for the
eurozone. Britain has always been critical of closer EU integration, and with their dismissal, EU
countries will be able to progress far faster when progressing legislation, such as creating a
European army (Griffiths, 2016). Research conducted by Annette Bongardt and Francisco Torres
supports the same claims. With roughly 1.2 million more votes placed towards the Leave
campaign, there is little doubt that a large majority of British citizens wanted to leave the EU,
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and that this removal of membership will lessen some of the burdens the EU faces when drafting
policy (Bongardt & Torres, 2016). Even more so, the relationship between the EU and the UK
may even strengthen due to this separation. The two separate entities can develop their
relationship on areas of common ground such as free-trade, while the EU no longer must
negotiate with the UK over topics of further European integration and open-borders (Bongardt &
Torres, 2016).
Supporters of Brexit do acknowledge the risks of leaving. First, there are short-term
economic consequences associated with leaving the EU which can lead to uncertainty and reduce
consumer and investment spending. Second, the UK may be permanently removed from the
Single Market which will decrease the profitability of their exports into EU countries. Third,
Scotland may vote for independence so that they can rejoin the EU (Griffiths, 2016). However,
the vote for Brexit is the step in the right direction for re-creating and strengthening the British
economy while pursuing policies that are better suited to the United Kingdom (Griffiths, 2016).
On the other side of the debate, a vast number of British citizens supported the Remain
campaign. Those who supported the Remain campaign claimed that leaving the EU would hurt
the economy, decrease international investment, and lesson the UK’s global influence (Coleman,
2016). Specifically, leaving the EU Single Market system would be detrimental to the economic
well-being of the United Kingdom (Coleman, 2016). The Remain campaign focused their efforts
towards broadcasting the threats associated with the EU, as opposed to broadcasting the benefits
of EU membership such as ever-closer union and borderless nations (Coleman, 2016).
Research conducted by Ansgar Belke and Daniel Gros support the negative economic
implications associated with Brexit. There is substantial research and past precedent that
supports the claim that the disconnection of the Single Market system will create economic costs
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for both the UK and the EU. It comes to no surprise that the economic costs will be large, as 306
billion British pounds are sent into the UK from the EU, while the UK exports 184 billion British
pounds (Belke & Gros, 2017). However, the EU will absorb less of the economic burden due to
being five times larger than the EU economically and having greater market power in general
(Belke & Gros, 2017). Further, past research also supports the claim that smaller parties have
more to gain from eliminating trade barriers, so the EU has a stronger negotiating position (Belke
& Gros, 2017). According to model-based simulations, the EU-27 on average will suffer losses
associated with trade coming in at 0.08 to .44% of GDP. The United Kingdom, on the other
hand, will suffer proportionately greater losses at approximately 1.31 to 4.21% of GDP
according to optimistic and pessimistic scenarios (Belke & Gros, 2017). Since the ratio of the
UK economy to the EU-27 is approximately 1:5, these disproportionate results come to no
surprise (Belke & Gros, 2017).
The ’Britain Stronger in Europe’ campaign did not only focus efforts on the economic
impact but also discussed the better leadership and better security associated with EU
membership (Vasilopoulou, 2016). Being a member of the EU enabled Britain to be a leader in
world events while having a strong pull in EU decision making, and terrorism and cross-border
crime was more effectively addressed through the EU (Vasilopoulou, 2016). Also, attitudes
towards EU migration and free-movement were strong voting predictors of the Brexit
referendum. Therefore, those who believed that immigrant-blaming was a fear-tactic and not a
true cause behind negative economic implications and terrorist attacks would most likely vote
against Brexit (Vasilopoulou, 2016). It is also interesting to note that research suggests that those
with superior educational backgrounds would typically support this type of thinking, would be
more likely to express positive EU attitudes and experience the economic benefits of European
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integration, and be less likely to feel threatened by the other integrated cultures (Vasilopoulou,
2016).
An important factor of predicting no-Brexit support was whether the individual supported
free-movement and globalization. The free movement of capital, goods, services, and labor are
considered the cornerstones of the EU and ultimately have an enormously positive impact on the
UK’s economy (Doherty, 2016). To gain support, the Remain campaign had to try and attempt to
address the free-movement criticisms from the Leave campaign. The Remain campaign would be
most effective when they discussed how EU citizens contributed to Britain’s growth,
investigated educational backgrounds, analyzed the sectors they worked in and finished with an
explanation on how the EU migrants brought skills to the UK economy which were previously
lacking (Vasilopoulou, 2016). However, some research suggests that income and education are
not related to attitudes towards EU freedom of movement, which goes against consensus
(Vasilopoulou, 2016).
UK citizens also supported the Remain campaign due to the socio-cultural consequences
that would develop out of Brexit. Those who were against Brexit were fearful of the deteriorating
social conditions that could solidify with leaving the EU and closing the UK’s borders. Most
younger voters desired to remain a part of the EU in opposition to racism and xenophobia
towards immigrants (Corbett, 2016). Those who wanted to remain in the EU saw their fears play
out as the UK saw a significant increase in racist and xenophobic attacks in the country, with a
42% increase in recorded hate crimes the week before and after the vote (Corbett, 2016). The
increase in racist remarks can potentially be traced back to those who felt threatened by the
increasing immigrant population and did not have the proper skills to survive in a post-industrial
economy (Corbett, 2016).
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C. Key Brexit Events
To analyze the economic impact of Brexit, stock market and currency returns
surrounding notable Brexit events will be analyzed. The list of the dates can be found below:
1) June 23, 2016: The Referendum takes places, and the UK votes to leave the European
Union. Prime Minister David Cameron, who led the Remain movement, steps down as
prime minister (Erlanger, 2016).
2) January 17, 2017: Prime Minister Theresa May gives an anticipated speech on the UK’s
Brexit Strategy (Castle & Erlanger, 2017).
3) March 29, 2017: The United Kingdom invokes Article 50 and sends a formal letter to EU
President Donald Tusk regarding their intention to leave the EU (BBC, 2017).
4) June 19, 2017: First round of EU-UK exit negotiations begin (Bienkov, 2017).
5) December 8, 2017: The UK and the EU come to terms on some aspects of the Brexit
deal, which allows Brexit negotiations to move on to the next phase (BBC, 2017).
6) June 20, 2018: The House of Commons Approves the EU Withdrawal Bill (Dorff &
Braiden, 2018).
7) July 9, 2018: The UK’s Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and Brexit minister David Davis
resign due to disagreements associated with her negotiated “soft Brexit” deals (Booth &
Adam, 2018).
8) October 16th, 2018: Trump Administration announces intent to negotiate trade
agreements with the UK and EU separately (Trump Administration Announces Intent to
Negotiate Trade Agreements with Japan, the European Union and the United Kingdom,
2018).
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9) October 19, 2018: A Brexit summit takes place during this week, and a Brexit deal has
not yet been reached (BBC, 2018).
10) November 14, 2018: British Prime Minister May secured cabinet approval for her soft
Brexit deal (Colchester, 2018).
11) November 15, 2018: The resignation of six U.K. ministers over a proposed Brexit deal
rattle the British pound and the European Markets (Gold & Menton, 2018).
12) November 16, 2018: Letters of no confidence in May’s leadership begin to be submitted
(Stewart & Elgot, 2018).
13) November 21, 2018: Theresa May is meeting up with European Commission President
Jean-Claude Juncker in a bid to finalize a Brexit deal in time for Sunday's EU summit
(Lawless & Cook, 2018).
14) November 25, 2018: EU and Theresa May agree on a Brexit deal (Colchester & Norman,
2018).
15) December 10, 2018: Theresa May delayed a critical parliamentary vote on her proposal
to leave the EU (Colchester, 2018).
16) December 11th, 2018: Theresa May is set to face a vote of no confidence (Colchester &
Fidler, 2018).
17) December 12th, 2018: Theresa May survives the no confidence vote (Colchester &
Douglas, 2018).
18) December 21st, 2018: Firms told to prepare for a no-deal Brexit (BBC, 2018).
19) January 15th, 2019: UK Parliament votes down Brexit deal (Booth, Adam & Birnbaum,
2019).
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20) January 25th, 2019: Northern Ireland's Democratic Unionist Party has privately decided to
back Prime Minister Theresa May's Brexit deal on a conditional basis (Dunn, 2019).
21) March 12th, 2019: Parliament votes down second deal (Colchester & Douglas, 2019).
22) March 13th, 2019: Parliament votes down no-deal option (Booth, Adam & Birnbaum,
2019).
23) March 14th, 2019: Parliament votes to delay Brexit (Booth, Adam & Birnbaum, 2019).
III.

Research Questions
The research is designed to analyze the relationship between Brexit news headlines and

financial market volatility. One specific area that will be explored is the comparative returns of
the United Kingdom and European Union benchmarks. By doing so, this will determine how
investors factor in the interconnectedness of the soon-to-be separate entities and ultimately will
see if they react in the same direction to positive and negative news. I suspect that the European
Union and United Kingdom ETFs and currencies will move in the same direction, but the United
Kingdom will have wider variations of return when compared to the European Union. This will
indicate, from a financial market standpoint, that investors do not believe Brexit is good for the
European Union but is not as detrimental as it is for the United Kingdom.
This research will also explore the impact Brexit has on a global financial market scale
outside of Europe. We live in a globalized economy, and because of this wide-spread connection
and reliance, I believe that non-Brexit related ETFs will tend to provide similar returns (in
relation to news announcements) as the United Kingdom and European Union. Lastly, the
relationship between European and non-European currencies will be studied as well. Since the
currency markets react differently than equity markets, I do not expect to have the same pattern
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of returns between the two, and non-European currencies will not be negatively affected to the
same degree as the pound and the euro.
IV.

Methodology
The first step in the research process consists of evaluating all the major news headlines

associated with Brexit and ultimately determining the research sample. The scope of the Brexit
news selection process ranged from the announcement of the results from the Referendum in
June of 2016 up until the Parliament vote to delay Brexit in March of 2019. In total, twenty-three
different Brexit events were used for the study. To evaluate the global market’s reaction to the
selected news headlines, various exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and currencies have been chosen
as benchmarks. The specific ETFs selected are iShares MSCI United Kingdom (EWU), iShares
MSCI Germany (EWG), iShares Europe (IEV), iShares Core S&P 500 (SPY), and iShares MSCI
South Africa (EZA). The specific currencies selected are the British pound, the euro, the US
dollar, and the South African Rand. The United Kingdom and European ETFs and currencies
were selected because of their direct involvement with Brexit, the United States was used due to
its strong global presence and ties to the European Union, and South Africa was selected to
assess a country that is not as directly impacted by Brexit but may still react in accordance with
the rest of the world.
Before the data collection took place, a prediction was made for each ETF and currency.
For example, if a news headline had positive connotations and seemed to be a good development
for either a specific country or all parties involved, and a positive return was to be expected, it
was assigned a “+”. For news headlines with negative connotations and a negative return was
expected, the benchmark was assigned a “-“. Each ETF and currency received a prediction (+ or
-) and were evaluated independently for each of the twenty-three Brexit events. Further, because

22

equity markets move differently than currencies, they were evaluated independently of each
other. For example, the ETF benchmark for the United States did not have the same positive or
negative return predictions as the US Dollar.
The daily stock return data for events up until December 2018 were collected from CRSP
– The Center for Research in Security Prices. CRSP did not contain data beyond 2018, so for the
Brexit events that took place during 2019, the daily return data was collected using the graphical
chart (GP) function within Bloomberg services. Currency return data was also obtained through
Bloomberg’s GP function. To evaluate the market reaction to the news headlines, total returns
(including dividends for the ETFs) were evaluated after the event took place. The daily return
used was dependent on the timing of the release of the news; if the event took place after the
markets closed, the following day’s returns were selected (t+1). However, if the news broke
during regular trading hours, the same day’s returns were used (t). Returns were not analyzed
from a prior-day standpoint (t-1); as stated, returns were either the day of the event or the next
day.
The data was analyzed individually for each benchmark as well as through an interconnected lens. For stand-alone assessment of market reactions, the total average return, average
return for all positive return predictions, average return for all negative return predictions,
average return for all actual positive and negative returns, the variation between the actual and
predicted positive and negative returns, and the count of total positive and negative returns were
recorded. To investigate the relationship between the ETFs and currencies, correlation and the
degree of movement in the same direction were assessed.
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V.

Results
A. Stock Returns Compared to Brexit News Headlines
The results for the ETF analysis can be found in Table 1, Stock Returns Compared to

Brexit News Headlines. According to the data in the table, it appears that the results of the
Referendum vote, as well as Theresa May’s delay of the first parliamentary vote for her Brexit
proposal, were the largest negative-return market movers. In terms of positive returns,
Parliament’s vote to delay Brexit in March 2019, as well as Parliament’s vote-down of a no-deal
Brexit, were both the two headlines that caused the most market movement. By counting the
returns based on whether they were “positive” or “negative”, the United States had the most
negative return count at 18 out of 23 headlines, with the United Kingdom following with 16 out
of 23 headlines, Germany had 15 out of 23, South Africa had 15 out of 22 (0% return on one
event) and the European Union had 14 out of 22. With the remaining returns being positive, the
European Union and Germany had the highest positive return count of 8, followed by the United
Kingdom and South Africa (7) and the United States (5).
On an average return basis, the United Kingdom lags with the only negative return of 0.01%. Germany, the European Union, the United States, and South African ETFs finished with
average positive returns coming in at 0.25%, 0.12%, 0.46%, and 0.80%, respectively. When
looking only at the positive returns, the United Kingdom came in lower than the other countries
with an average return of 0.98%, while Germany had a return of 1.20%, EU returned 1.18%, the
United States returned 0.99%, and South Africa came in at the highest with a 2.21% return.
When observing only negative returns, the United Kingdom had the lowest average return at 2.29%, with Germany having a return of -1.53%, EU with a return of -1.73%, the United States
with a return of -1.43%, and South Africa with a return of -2.08%. By solely observing the
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ranges between the average positive and negative returns for each ETF, it was determined that
South Africa had the highest at a range of 4.29%, with the United Kingdom coming in second
with a range of 3.27%, followed by the European Union, Germany, and the United States with
ranges of 2.92%, 2.73%, and 2.42%, respectively.
An analysis of the average returns gives great insight into how investors value the
different stakeholders in Brexit. The United Kingdom, the main party involved with leaving the
European Union, is the only ETF that did not have a positive average return. This intuitively
makes sense as negative news associated with Brexit will pull down the United Kingdom ETF
further than the others observed in this sample. This strong negative reaction resulted in the
United Kingdom having the lowest overall “actual negative return” average; the average is even
lower than the very cyclical South African ETF. However, this momentum did not carry over to
the news headlines that generated positive returns. On an “actual positive return” basis, the
United Kingdom had the lowest average compared to all other benchmarks, and most notably,
Germany and the European Union. Although the United Kingdom is the most impacted, positive
news associated with the development of Brexit appears to be more beneficial for Europe (and
other countries) as opposed to the United Kingdom individually. Investors seem to be pricing in
the idea that a smooth Brexit is beneficial for the global economy, especially when the outside
countries do not have a direct hand in the negotiation process. However, Brexit appears to be
perceived as a negative (or uncertain) development for the United Kingdom solely on the basis
that they have the lowest average positive and negative returns.
The relationship amongst the ETFs can be observed in Table 5, Stock Return Correlation.
As shown in the table, The United Kingdom has a strong relationship with the European Union
and Germany with correlations above 97%. The United Kingdom also has a relatively strong
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relationship with the United States and South Africa with a correlation around 80%, but it is not
as strong when compared to the European counterparts. A more in-depth look at the
interconnectedness of the benchmarks can be observed in Table 3, United Kingdom Stock Return
Movements in Relation to Other Countries. As seen in Table 3, 86.96% of the time the Germany
and the United Kingdom ETFs moved in the same direction in relation to the news
announcements (in terms of being either a positive or negative returns). A similar relationship is
found between the United Kingdom and the European Union as well as the three European
countries collectively; they all moved in the same direction 78.26% of the time. Movements
appear to be most related when the news headlines generated positive returns, as 70% of the
same return movements between Germany and the United Kingdom were positive, and 72.2%
between the United Kingdom, the EU, and Germany. A similar relationship is found when
comparing all benchmarks as they moved in the same direction 56.52% of the time, of which
84.62% were positive returns. However, with negative returns shared between the UK and
Germany, the United Kingdom has lower-negative returns 83.33% of the time, as well as 60% of
the time between the European Union and Germany together. When looking at shared positive
returns, the United Kingdom exceeded Germany returns only 28.57% of the time, while
exceeding Germany and the EU collectively 30.77% of the time. This appears to reinforce the
previous findings that the United Kingdom, Germany, and the European Union ETFs are often
affected in a similar manner regarding Brexit news announcements. However, most of their
shared movements tend to be positive returns as opposed to negative which emphasizes the point
that good news is beneficial for all. The same relationship is found between the United Kingdom
ETF and the United States and South African ETFs. The United Kingdom and the United States
benchmarks moved in the same direction 73.91% of the time; 82.35% of those movements were
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associated with positive news developments. The United Kingdom and the South African
benchmarks moved in the same direction 69.57% of the time; 81.25% of those movements were
also associated with positive news developments. This goes to show that the globalized
connection in the financial markets is strong, investors believe Brexit will impact the world
economy, and positive Brexit news headlines are considered a plus for countries outside Europe
as well. Although positive developments are a universal benefit, the data again shows that it is
more beneficial for the European Union and Germany because their positive returns tend to
outperform the United Kingdom benchmark. Further, same-direction negative returns affect the
United Kingdom to a greater degree when compared to the rest of Europe, which shows investors
pricing in the potential negative (or uncertain) implications of Brexit.
B. Currency Returns Compared to Brexit News Headlines
An analysis of currency returns regarding Brexit news headlines can be found in Table 2,
Currency Returns Compared to Brexit News Headlines. According to the data, the Referendum,
the resignation of six United Kingdom ministers, Theresa May’s delay of the first parliamentary
vote on her Brexit proposal, Parliament voting down no-deal Brexit, Theresa May’s anticipated
Brexit strategy speech, and Theresa May surviving the no confidence vote were all the largest
currency market movers. However, the movements amongst all four currencies (pound, euro,
dollar, and rand) were not uniform, and reacted differently in accordance with each news
headline. When counting total negative currency return movements, the US dollar had the most
with 13 out of 23, the euro had 12 out of 22 (one event had 0% return), the pound had 10 out of
22, and the rand had 8 out of 23. For total positive currency return movements, the rand had the
most at 15 out of 23, the pound had 13 out of 23, the euro had 10 out of 22, and the dollar had 10
out of 23.
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When observing the average return, the dollar had the highest at 0.058%; this is mostly
attributed to the 2.05% increase on the day of the Referendum. The pound had the lowest
average return at -0.291%, the rand’s average return was -0.081%, and the euro was -0.042%.
When observing only positive returns, the rand had the highest average return at 1.318%, then
the pound at 0.782%, the dollar at 0.435%, and the euro at 0.374%. For only negative returns, the
pound had the lowest average return at -1.117%, the rand had a -0.827% average return, the euro
had a -0.545% average return, and the dollar had the highest negative-only average return at 0.432%. By observing the range between the average positive and average negative returns, it
was determined that the rand had the highest variation at 2.14%, then the pound at 1.90%, the
euro at 0.92%, and the dollar with the least amount of variation at 0.87%.
It intuitively makes sense that the pound would have the lowest average return and lowest
average negative-only return, similar to the United Kingdom ETF, as the United Kingdom is the
main party involved with Brexit and any investor uncertainty or negative forecasts will directly
impact their currency. However, unlike the UK ETF, the pound had the second highest average
positive return behind only the South African Rand. In the case of the pound, it appears that
when positive news-headlines eliminated a degree of uncertainty with Brexit, investors began to
value the pound to a higher degree and placed their money within the UK economy. Although
this is the case, and the pound itself had less negative return events than the euro and the dollar,
investors still outweighed the negatives associated with Brexit more than the positives which
resulted in the overall-lowest average return amongst the currencies in this sample. To go
alongside the inconsistency with Brexit developments, the pound had a relatively high variation
between the average positive and negative returns, which was only 0.24% less than the cyclical
South African Rand. In contrast to the pound’s variation, the US dollar had the least amount of
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movement between the positive and negative average returns, and even though it had the most
instances of negative returns (13 occasions), it was the only currency with a positive average
return. This may indicate that investors tend to value the consistency and strength of the US
economy as opposed to the United Kingdom and the rest of the uncertain Eurozone and will opt
to place their investments into the safe dollar.
The relationship amongst the currencies can be seen in Table 6, Currency Return
Correlation. According to Table 6, the pound and the euro have a strong positive relationship
with a correlation of 84.71%. When comparing the pound to the dollar and the rand, it appears
that they have a negative relationship with correlations of -85.60% and -69.82%, respectively.
Further analysis of the relationship between the currencies can be found in Table 4, United
Kingdom Currency Return Movements in Relation to Other Countries. As the correlation matrix
suggested, the euro and the pound moved in the same direction 69.57% of the time; this is not as
strong as the ETF correlation but is still a meaningful relationship that shows investors generally
associate the pound and the euro with uncertainty (although the pound has more uncertainty than
the euro). The pound and the rand do not appear to have a strong connection as they only moved
in the same direction 39.13% of the time. The most interesting finding is that the US dollar and
the pound only moved in the same direction 8.70% of the time, which goes alongside the nearly
perfect negative correlation found in Table 6. This indicates that investors will use the dollar as a
safe-haven currency when uncertain Brexit events take place. However, when positive Brexit
events occur, investors begin to gain more confidence in the future of the United Kingdom and
will shift their money from the dollar to the pound. Unlike the ETFs, the currencies do not
always react in the same manner; the euro and the pound tend to be positively correlated with the
pound having a greater variation of return, the pound and the rand appear to be unconnected, and
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the pound and the dollar have a negative-correlation relationship that depends on the status of
Brexit progress.
C. Predicted Returns Accuracy
The results of forecasting the positive and negative stock returns per news announcement
can be found in Table 7, Stock Return Prediction Accuracy by Country. The most successful
forecasts were made in the United Kingdom with 78.26% correct, next came Germany at
69.57%, the European Union at 60.87%, the United States with 56.52% accuracy, and South
Africa at 43.48%. The results are logical as it was easier to estimate the impact of Brexit events
with those who were directly impacted such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and the European
Union. It became progressively more difficult to project the outcomes for countries outside of
Europe who were incrementally less involved with Brexit. Knowing that the United States has a
strong presence throughout the world, it was safe to assume many major-news developments
would somehow impact the country as well. South Africa was a challenging country to predict
due to a combination of its size as well as its cyclical emerging-market fluctuations. Emerging
market ETFs are difficult to predict from an independent stand-point, let alone alongside Brexit
news. The return results of the predictions can be found in Table 1, Stock Returns Compared to
Brexit News Headlines. All average return “+” predictions are actually positive for each country,
and for average return “-” predictions, South Africa is the outlier with the only positive return of
0.11%. It is interesting to note that not only on a percentage basis were the United Kingdom
predictions successful, but from a return standpoint as well; The predicted average “+” return
(1.06%) exceeded the actual “+” return (0.98%). However, the degree of negative returns was
underestimated for the United Kingdom as the predicted “-” return (-1.42%) was higher than the
actual “-” return (-2.29%). As it became more difficult to forecast the returns, the strong return
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results began to deteriorate; South African “+” return prediction were lower than actual “+”
returns by 0.87%, and “-” return predictions were off by 2.19%.
Return predictions made for each currency in the sample can be found in Table 8,
Currency Return Predictions by Type. Similar to the ETF predictions, the pound was the most
successful at 78.26% correct. However, and unlike the ETF predictions, the dollar return
predictions were equally as successful at 78.26%. The reasoning behind this occurrence is
because the predictions for currencies were made separately from the ETFs. By knowing that the
dollar may potentially appreciate when poor Brexit developments occur, it was less challenging
to predict as opposed to forecasting the global connections in the stock market. The success with
the European ETFs did not translate to euro return predictions, as the forecasts were correct
56.52% of the time. These results reflect the disconnect between the currency and stock markets
and how investors may interpret the value of the two separate investments in a different manner.
As expected, the worst prediction results came from the South African Rand with forecasts being
right 52.17% of the time. Similar to the South African ETF, it was difficult to judge the reactions
of a country that is not directly involved with Brexit. When looking at the numbers, all average
“-” predictions were negative, with the most accurate predictions coming from the rand and the
dollar (in terms of comparing the actual average of negative returns). The pound was off by
approximately 0.47% which was due to underestimating the negative affect Brexit has had on the
pound. The most accurate “+” predictions came from the euro and the dollar. The pound was off
by 0.797% because of underestimating the currency swings caused by Brexit. South African
Rand predictions were off by 0.97% due to the difficulty associated with connecting its currency
to Brexit news.
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VI.

Conclusion
The largest limitation associated with this research is that the ETFs and currencies are not

only impacted by Brexit news headlines. Other developments took place each day in this sample;
they could range from US and China trade talks, Germany manufacturing data, China fiscal
policy data, OPEC oil cuts, and countless other factors. A key aspect of this thesis was the
selection process of the news headlines. Each event was selected because an assumption was
made that they were major enough to move the market in either a positive or negative way.
However, it would be incorrect to not acknowledge the fact that many other world-events affect
returns. To go alongside this limitation, it is equally important to note that this study does not
analyze returns on an immediate basis. As opposed to looking at the benchmark’s minutes after
the news announcements, this research looks at next day reactions which gives more time for
other events to impact the market. Another limitation associated with this research is the
selection process of Brexit events. Each event was hand-picked by tracking Brexit for almost 3
years dating back to the Referendum, so it is not impossible to have missed a news headline that
greatly impacted the financial markets.
My research can easily be continued moving into the future. Brexit is still ongoing, and at
the time this thesis is being written, the United Kingdom Parliament is still debating its European
Union exit strategy. As more headlines appear each day, stock market and currency reactions can
continue to be recorded and analyzed. To improve upon my current research, immediate market
reaction data could be obtained as opposed to measuring total returns on a daily basis. I would
also be interested in comparing Brexit stock market reactions to other United Kingdom and
European Union historical events such as the origination or the European Union or the creation
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of the euro. I would be curious to see if similar patterns in stock market and currency
relationships have occurred throughout the shaky relationship between the two entities.
The United Kingdom and the European Union have had a complicated and tense
relationship since the very beginning; as the European Union began to take form throughout the
20th century, it always seemed like the United Kingdom was never fully on-board with the
concept in its entirety. When looking at the development between two entities, it does not come
to a surprise that the people of the United Kingdom voted to permanently leave the bloc.
However, this thesis did not look at Brexit and the UK-EU conflict from a historical perspective
but focused in on the current events surrounding Brexit and analyzed the connections between
news headlines and financial market volatility. By doing so, this research shed light on how
investors factor in the interconnectedness of the soon-to-be separate entities by comparing ETF
and currency returns as well as analyzing the global scale of Brexit and its impact on nonEuropean nations. From a stock market standpoint, the United Kingdom ETF benchmark was the
only one with an overall negative return, and that on an actual positive return basis the United
Kingdom had the lowest average compared to all other benchmarks. Further, approximately 70%
of the same-direction ETF movements amongst the UK, Germany and EU were associated with
positive news developments, as well as 82.35% of the time with the United States. In terms of
the currencies in this study, the pound had the lowest average return and the lowest average
negative-only return. Global currency connection was showcased as the pound and the dollar had
a negative correlation of -85.60% which indicates that because of the uncertainty surrounding the
UK economy, investors safe-guarded their assets in the consistent United States economy
whenever unfavorable Brexit events occurred. These findings defend the fact that the globalized
relations in the stock and currency markets are strong and that positive Brexit news headlines are
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priced in as a benefit for many stakeholders within and outside of Europe. However, the data also
visually displays the fact that positive Brexit developments generate higher returns for the
European Union and Germany as opposed to the United Kingdom itself, and that same-direction
negative returns affect the United Kingdom to a greater extant when compared to European
returns. Investors are clearly pricing in the uncertain and negative implications of Brexit to the
point where the United Kingdom has limited upside and plenty of downside within the realms of
the financial markets. Until Brexit developments begin to follow a clear trajectory, this trend will
persist as the United Kingdom struggles to eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the future of
their economy, their global footprint, and their affiliation with the European Union.
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Tables

Table 1
Stock Returns Compared to Brexit News Headlines

Date
6/23/2016

1/17/2017

3/29/2017

6/19/2017

12/8/2017

6/20/2018

7/9/2018

10/16/2018

10/19/2018

11/14/2018

11/15/2018

Event
Referendum
Prime Minister
Theresa May
gives an
anticipated
speech on the
UK’s Brexit
Strategy
The United
Kingdom
invokes
Article 50
First round of
EU-UK Exit
Negotiations
Begin
The UK and
the EU come
to terms on
some aspects
of the Brexit
deal
The House of
Commons
Approves the
EU
Withdrawal
Bill
The UK’s
Foreign
Secretary
Boris Johnson
and Brexit
minister David
Davis resign
Trump
Administration
announces
intent to
negotiate trade
agreements
with the UK
and EU
separately
A Brexit
summit takes
place during
this week, and
a Brexit deal
has not yet
been reached
British Prime
Minister May
secured
cabinet
approval for
her soft Brexit
deal
The
resignation of
six U.K.
ministers over
a proposed

US
Return
-3.64%

South
African
Return
Prediction
(EZA)
-

SA
Return
-9.99%

+

-0.35%

+

-0.11%

-0.09%

+

0.09%

+

-0.27%

+

0.38%

+

0.83%

+

0%

0.36%

+

0.51%

+

0.55%

+

0.54%

+

-0.10%

+

-0.02%

+

0.17%

+

1.50%

0.85%

-

0.55%

-

0.64%

-

0.90%

-

3.10%

+

1.10%

+

1.92%

+

1.60%

+

2.20%

+

4.31%

-

-0.58%

-

-0.50%

-

-0.59%

-

-0.45%

-

1.15%

+

0.22%

+

0.37%

+

0.12%

+

-0.68%

+

-0.12%

-

-0.59%

-

0.37%

-

0%

-

1.04%

-

4.41%

UK
Return
Prediction
(EWU)
-

UK
Return
-11.96%

Germany
Return
Prediction
(EWG)
-

Germany
Return
-9.70%

EU
Return
Prediction
(IEV)
-

EU
Return
-10.90%

US
Return
Prediction
(SPY)
-

+

0.13%

+

0.22%

+

-0.08%

+

0.12%

+

-0.10%

+

+

0.18%

+

0.70%

+

0.72%

+

+

0.06%

-
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11/16/2018

11/21/2018

11/25/2018

12/10/2018

12/11/2018

12/12/2018

12/21/2018

1/15/2019

1/25/2019

3/12/2019

3/13/2019

3/14/2019
Average
Return
Average
Return
“+”
prediction
Average
Return “”
prediction
Average
Return
“+”
Average
Return “”
Range of
Prediction
Range of
Actual
Number
of +
Number
of -

Brexit deal
rattle the
British pound
and the
European
Markets
Letters of no
confidence in
May’s
leadership
begin to be
submitted
Theresa May
is meeting
up with
President
Jean-Claude
Juncker.
EU, UK
approve Brexit
deal
Theresa May
delayed a
critical
parliamentary
vote on her
proposal to
leave the EU
Theresa May
is set to face a
vote of no
confidence
Theresa May
survives the no
confidence
vote
Firms told to
prepare for a
no-deal Brexit
UK Parliament
votes down
deal
Northern
Ireland
Democratic
Support
Parliament
Votes Down
Second Deal
Parliament
Votes Down
No-deal Brexit
Parliament
Votes to Delay
Brexit

-

-0.50%

-

-0.07%

-

0.02%

-

0.26%

-

1.04%

+

1.67%

+

1.70%

+

1.35%

+

0.34%

+

1.35%

+

1.63%

+

1.88%

+

1.59%

+

1.61%

+

3.03%

-

-1.12%

-

-0.66%

-

-0.77%

-

0.19%

-

-1.75%

-

0.30%

-

0.47%

-

0.35%

-

0.02%

-

1.39%

-

1.17%

-

1.56%

-

1.76%

-

0.50%

-

3.55%

-

-0.83%

-

-0.99%

-

-1.24%

-

-2.04%

-

-1.76%

-

-0.46%

-

-0.15%

-

-0.18%

-

0.77%

-

2.24%

+

0.98%

+

2.94%

+

1.72%

+

1.11%

+

2.75%

-

0.68%

-

0.74%

-

0.75%

-

1.83%

-

1.27%

+

2.41%

+

1.60%

+

2.31%

+

2.44%

+

-0.58%

+

3.50%

+

2.57%

+

3.44%

+

2.95%

+

1.46%

-0.01%

0.25%

0.12%

0.46%

0.80%

1.06%

1.20%

1.12%

0.90%

1.34%

-1.42%

-0.99%

-1.19%

-0.11%

0.11%

0.98%

1.20%

1.18%

0.99%

2.21%

-2.29%

-1.53%

-1.73%

-1.43%

-2.08%

2.48%

2.20%

2.31%

1.02%

1.23%

3.27%

2.73%

2.92%

2.42%

4.29%

7

8

8

5

7

16

15

14

18

15
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Table 2
Currency Returns Compared to Brexit News Headlines
Date
6/23/2016

1/17/2017

3/29/2017

6/19/2017

12/8/2017

6/20/2018

7/9/2018

10/16/2018

10/19/2018

11/14/2018

11/15/2018

Event
Referendum
Prime Minister
Theresa May
gives an
anticipated
speech on the
UK’s Brexit
Strategy
The United
Kingdom
invokes
Article 50
First round of
EU-UK Exit
Negotiations
Begin
The UK and
the EU come
to terms on
some aspects
of the Brexit
deal
The House of
Commons
Approves the
EU
Withdrawal
Bill
The UK’s
Foreign
Secretary
Boris Johnson
and Brexit
minister David
Davis resign
Trump
Administration
announces
intent to
negotiate trade
agreements
with the UK
and EU
separately
A Brexit
summit takes
place during
this week, and
a Brexit deal
has not yet
been reached
British Prime
Minister May
secured
cabinet
approval for
her soft Brexit
deal
The
resignation of
six U.K.
ministers over
a proposed
Brexit deal
rattle the
British pound
and the
European
Markets

UK
Prediction
-

GBP
Curncy
-8.05%

Europe
Prediction
-

EUR
Curncy
-2.35%

US
Prediction
+

DXY
Curncy
2.05%

South
African
Prediction
+

ZAR
Curncy
4.62%

+

1.90%

+

0.66%

-

-0.84%

+

-0.36%

+

-0.13%

+

-0.44%

+

0.29%

+

0.38%

+

-0.36%

+

-0.43%

+

0.40%

+

1.47%

+

-0.62%

+

0.00%

-

0.11%

+

-0.48%

+

0.51%

+

0.28%

-

-0.28%

+

-0.58%

-

-0.17%

-

0.04%

+

0.12%

-

-0.45%

+

0.22%

+

-0.04%

+

0.02%

+

-1.44%

-

-0.86%

-

-0.43%

+

0.31%

-

-0.65%

+

0.12%

+

0.18%

-

-0.51%

+

-0.43%

-

-1.68%

-

0.16%

+

0.13%

-

-1.51%
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11/16/2018

11/21/2018

11/25/2018

12/10/2018

12/11/2018

12/12/2018

12/21/2018

1/15/2019

1/25/2019

3/12/2019

3/13/2019

3/14/2019
Average
Return
Average
Return “+”
prediction
Average
Return “-”
prediction
Average
Return “+”
Average
Return “-”
Range of
Prediction
Range of
Actual
Number of
+
Number of
-

Letters of no
confidence in
May’s
leadership
begin to be
submitted
Theresa May
is meeting
up with
European
Commission
President
Jean-Claude
Juncker in a
bid to finalize
a Brexit deal
in time for
Sunday's EU
summit
EU, UK
approve Brexit
deal
Theresa May
delayed a
critical
parliamentary
vote on her
proposal to
leave the EU
Theresa May
is set to face a
vote of no
confidence
Theresa May
survives the no
confidence
vote
Firms told to
prepare for a
no-deal Brexit
UK Parliament
votes down
deal
Northern
Ireland
Democratic
Support
Parliament
Votes Down
Second Deal
Parliament
Votes Down
No-deal Brexit
Parliament
Votes to Delay
Brexit

-

0.47%

-

0.77%

+

-0.48%

-

-1.30%

+

-0.08%

+

0.12%

-

-0.13%

+

-1.34%

+

0.10%

+

-0.08%

-

0.16%

+

0.34%

-

-1.30%

-

-0.20%

+

0.73%

-

1.56%

-

-0.59%

-

-0.34%

+

0.17%

-

-0.29%

+

1.14%

-

0.46%

+

-0.35%

-

-1.60%

-

-0.09%

-

-0.65%

+

0.71%

-

1.59%

-

-0.02%

-

-0.49%

+

0.45%

-

-0.28%

+

0.99%

+

0.90%

-

-0.84%

+

-0.75%

-

-0.57%

-

0.38%

+

-0.29%

-

0.09%

+

2.01%

+

0.35%

-

-0.40%

+

0.49%

+

0.36%

+

0.19%

-

-0.20%

+

-0.94%

-0.291%

-0.042%

0.058%

-0.081%

0.474%

0.165%

0.304%

0.075%

-1.286%

-0.311%

-0.326%

-0.284%

0.782%

0.374%

0.435%

1.318%

-1.117%

-0.545%

-0.432%

-0.827%

1.76%

0.48%

0.63%

0.36%

1.90%

0.92%

0.87%

2.14%

13

10

10

15

10

12

13

8
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Table 3
United Kingdom Stock Return Movements in Relation to Other Countries

Germany
EU
EU & Germany
US
South Africa
All Together

% Move in Same
Direction
86.96%
78.26%
78.26%
73.91%
69.57%
56.52%

% Negative
Movements in
Same Direction
30.00%
27.78%
27.78%
17.65%
20.00%
15.38%

% Positive
Movements in the
Same Direction
70.00%
72.22%
72.22%
82.35%
81.25%
84.62%

UK Neg Exceed
83.33%
60.00%
60.00%
66.67%
33.33%
50.00%

UK Pos Exceed
28.57%
53.85%
30.77%
50.00%
30.77%
15.38%
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Table 4
United Kingdom Currency Return Movements in Relation to Other Countries

Euro
Dollar
ZAR

% Move in Same
Direction
69.57%
8.70%
39.13%

% Negative
Movements in Same
Direction
50.00%
50.00%
77.78%

% Positive
Movements in the
Same Direction
50.00%
50.00%
22.22%

UK Neg Exceed
50.00%
0.00%
57.14%

UK Pos Exceed
75.00%
0.00%
50.00%
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Table 5
Stock Return Correlation
UK Return
UK Return
Germany Return
EU Return
US Return
SA Return

1
0.973235
0.992478
0.800511
0.804506

Germany Return
1
0.987508
0.813305
0.859068

EU Return

1
0.837109
0.837409

US Return

1
0.724195

SA Return

1
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Table 6
Currency Return Correlation
GBP Curncy
GBP Curncy
EUR Curncy
DXY Curncy
ZAR Curncy

1
0.847133
-0.85599
-0.6982

EUR Curncy
1
-0.95564
-0.79377

DXY Curncy

1
0.77938

ZAR Curncy

1
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Table 7
Stock Return Prediction Accuracy by Country
Country
UK
Germany
EU
US
South Africa

Correct Prediction
78.26%
69.57%
60.87%
56.52%
43.48%
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Table 8
Currency Return Prediction Accuracy by Type
Currency
Pound
Euro
Dollar
ZAR

Correct Prediction
78.26%
56.52%
78.26%
52.17%

